AC Milan beat reduced Slavia Praha 4-2 in the first leg of the Europa League round of 16 at San Siro. The Czech team received a red card in the 26th minute with the score 0-0, but at half-time it was 3-1 for the Rossoneri.
Despite the merit of two goals against Prague next week in the second leg, the prevailing feeling among Stefano Pioli and several of his players is one of sadness at Milan’s performance.
After the end of the match, Slavia coach Jindrich Trpisovsky said: “In the first 25 minutes it was a smart game, we did even better than Milan. Then, after the red card, the game changed.
Here he is to provide his observations on the game, before and after the red card, @Tactics_Tweets.
In the first twenty-five minutes, statistically, Milan had maximum possession. However, as the xG chart below shows, this dominance of the ball translated into shots for the hosts.
These stats only show the effects of express game events, but don’t tell the full story. In reality, Slavia were backing down, allowing their warring parties to have ownership or, to be more accurate, allowing Milan’s centre-backs to have comfort. property in front of them.
Simon Kjær attempted 109 passes in the match, the most of any Milan player and the highest attempted by the Danish defender in 2023/24 (he averages 58 pass attempts out of 90). And to further accentuate that point, Kjær’s defensive partner in the first half, Matteo Gabbia, was fourth on the pass attempt list, despite playing just 40 minutes in total.
But positioning themselves in their own component and giving the ball to opposing centre-backs was only part of Slavia’s out-of-possession plan. The rest of the team worked in a 4-2-3-1 / 4-4-1-1 defensive system. .
The visiting team’s four defenders had a 1 against Milan’s three forwards. Their full-backs stayed close to Christian Pulisic and Rafael Leão, leaving their two centre-backs covering Giroud. Their two most central midfielders, Lukáš Masopust and Oscar Dorley, stayed close to the two most complex rival midfielders, the maximum Ruben Loftus-Cheek and Tijjani Reijnders.
Slavia’s wingers covered and followed Milan’s full-backs, then Mojmir Chytil and Lukáš Provod split the job between sitting on Yacine Adli and committing the Milan centre-back in possession into secure triggers, e. g. proximity or progression in Slavia’s half, etc.
And those defensive tactics resulted in: 1) the majority of Milan’s ownership being at the feet of their two centre-backs and 2) being limited to all other Milan players, and those are the reasons why Milan struggled to create chances against the red map. .
Here’s a practical example from the 13th minute. The home team had just made it difficult for the more sensible players on their side thanks to a goal kick. As you can see below, Slavia players go about their respective day-to-day jobs as described above.
At first, Milan began to circulate the ball down their right flank, but as all complex players were intensely chased by the opposition, the hosts recycled ownership to their weak centre-backs.
Gabbia then tried to advance down the left flank, but the angle of her pass towards Theo Hernandez’s goal did not give the French left-back the option to drop back yet.
From there, Milan were forced to return the pass to Mike Maignan. Thus, after more than thirty seconds of uninterrupted possession, the home team returned to where they started, where the cycle was repeated.
Milan were allowed to move the ball into their own half without much opposition. Gabbia then found himself in a lot of area to play forward, either to bring in or to pass.
In this case, Theo Hernandez, who in the last action had taken the ball into the box before returning, took advantage of his starting central position to review and penetrate the Slavia lane and the back four. As you can see below, this resolve and off-the-ball movement created a rift with their goalscorer, David Doudera (right winger).
But, as Slavia’s defensive plan had bet, if you’re going to concede ownership to opponents, make sure they’re the ones who can do you the least damage. And that’s precisely what happened, as Gabbia didn’t try the riskiest (but most rewarding) pass to Theo Hernandez, opting instead for a certain ball to Leão that he put offside.
And that recurring trend of Milan ownership in the early periods of the game. Here’s another example from the 17th minute. A Milan centre-back, namely Kjær, owns the ten Slavia outfield players in front of him.
The off-the-ball movements of the Milan players (Adli shooting further into the box and getting the ball, then Pulisic and Reijnders making counter-moves) created the potential opportunity to place a ball over the Slavia backline for Reijnders to get behind.
Adli also chose to oppose this type of pass, opting to retain ownership and return the pass to Kjær. From there, Milan swapped passes and executed additional rotations down the right flank before Florenzi attempted a pass over the more sensitive one for a Pulisic run behind. however, he intercepted and Slavia conceded a throw-in.
From the restart, Milan first sent the ball to their left flank, but despite the available area, Gabbia played confidently (or was patient, depending on the perspective) and passed laterally to Kjær, while her teammates continued their play. off-the-ball movement (see Theo Hernandez and Reijnders below).
Seeing the opportunity to penetrate, Kjær had the courage to try the pass but did not execute it, but Slavia intercepted and got rid of the danger.
Thus, in these two examples, we have observed other decisions that have not yet been successful. One of the centre-backs is not confident enough in his technical talent to execute a penetrating pass and the other is content to accept the challenge, even if he was unsuccessful in his attempt. For reference, the two central defenders presented examples in both categories.
But difficulties with ownership weren’t the only difficulties Milan faced before the sending-off. When Slavia had the ball, they were able to play through their warring sides and get the final third, but they lacked quality in their final actions (passes, crosses and shots).
Without possession, Milan gave shape to their old defensive system. There were four defenders, three midfielders with daily jobs focused on the players and three forwards divided between the four opposing defenders.
The challenge the home team faced was that the visitors made a lot of position exchanges and off-the-ball rotations that they created and then found the player on the loose. And there was a better representation of this in the 14th minute.
A Slavia throw-in on their left flank played to their right-back. In central midfield, the team’s visiting double pivot began his off-the-ball rotation to alter the marking system of Milan’s midfielders.
The Czech team recirculated the ball along their defensive line and to their left where, as can be seen below, Slavia’s double pivot had replaced the horizontal lines and Doudera (right winger) and Provod (second striker) had dropped towards the ball. building your team. The latter’s downward movement also dragged Florenzi onto the pitch.
But Slavia opted not to advance down their left flank and instead sent the ball back to their right flank, where they managed to break through the first line of Milan’s defence, with a pass to Doudera, who was in his new position.
Outside of the shot, what you don’t see below is that Theo Hernandez (who would usually be the right-back player on duty) made the decision not to stay on top at all. In fact, Slavia’s right-back Tomáš Vlček made a counter-move on the pitch to give Milan’s left-back the decision to decide which opponent to cover.
This meant that Doudera was able to get and turn around before locating a loose Provod. How? Well, after Florenzi’s retirement, probably to cover the back line and out of fear of the opposing left-back (El Hadji Diouf), Provod has become a free agent and Pulisic has been in charge of marking him. But the American didn’t react enough temporarily, which made it imaginable to make the pass.
Provod then proceeded to move before completing the wonderful combination of one or two passes from distance with Doudera, who had continued his advance (untracked) to exploit the area created in Milan’s defensive form. However, despite the opportunity favouring a left-footed shot, Doudera repositioned himself to shoot with his right foot, but only controlled to cut his shot safely away from Milan’s near post.
So that was the story of Milan’s problems before the red card. And the real preparation for this expulsion was a familiar scene. It started midway through the 24th minute when Milan had the upper hand with Kjær swooning in front of a falling Florenzi. Elsewhere, Slavia’s players fulfilled all their defensive roles.
After receiving the ball, Florenzi took possession of Milan’s left side, where he followed his pass, along with other simultaneous minor rotations from the Milan midfielder, and the ball ended up in the hands of Gabbia, who stepped forward but then played safely for Theo Hernandez.
Milan continued to hold ownership for the next 30 seconds, but made little headway in terms of territorial gain. The ball was still in the hands of the centre-backs and in front of Slavia.
Gabbia had a chance to make a pass over the right for a quick run from Loftus-Cheek, but the centre-back kept it unchallenged and gave it to his wife Kjær.
Milan held ownership for thirty seconds and, in doing so, dragged several of his conflicting sides deeper, creating an opportunity for Gabbia to obtain and then chase acres of area in front of him.
Which the centre-back accepted, but after achieving the final third he faded away against Leão who, despite being the maximum artistic option, had few functions ahead of him, so he opted to return to Adli.
The French playmaker was right to lose his marker, then made a pass to Pulisic’s feet that tempted Diouf with his reckless tackle, when it wasn’t needed, and ended with the Slavia left-back getting his marching orders and eventually the game. replaced from that point on.
While Milan likely benefited from their players’ advantage, taking the lead less than ten minutes later and going into the halftime with a 3-1 lead, in the second half they recovered some of their early struggles.
But until then, Slavia will probably be disappointed with the goals conceded. The first, the result of a too-deep drop by their central defence, which allowed Giroud to head home from close range. However, the visitors equalised a few minutes later, thanks to a stunning volley from the edge of the box on a corner, which they won after a slip by Gabbia.
Milan regained the lead in the 44th minute when Reijnders controlled to direct the ball through several warring sides on a penalty corner. And then, in stoppage time, Loftus-Cheek headed into the corner to give the period a two-goal lead.
At half-time, Pioli made two changes. Davide Calabria replaced Florenzi, who booked and Fikayo Tomori replaced Gabbia, perhaps because of the English defender’s two minutes and impressive technical quality in possession. But those worker tweaks haven’t replaced the gambling trend in any way.
In the second half, even with an extra outfield player, Milan struggled to break through their opponents. It should be noted that with a two-goal lead, the Rossoneri did not want to force their attacking play and would have possibly been told to be more conservative in ownership to avoid giving Slavia opportunities to get back into the game.
However, Pioli’s post-match comment that he “expected a second half with more pace”, this theory has less substance. So how can it be that Slavia’s ten men are still so difficult to face?
Well, the visitors continued to pull away from their opponents. Their defenders still covered Milan’s front 3 (Ondřej Zmrzlý dropped to left-back). And Slavia’s wingers (Provod moved to the left wing) were still tasked with covering and tracking. Milan’s full-backs.
The differences came from Slavia’s two central midfielders and the single striker (Chytil), who worked hard to cover four (sometimes five) Milan players. This included Milan’s two centre-backs and three midfielders, Slavia’s backup centre-back contributed to this by jumping. to cover any complex and loose opposing midfielder.
The priority remained to restrict access to the most damaging players (midfielders), with the compromise being to force (allow) ownership to Milan’s central defenders. And it was Slavia’s power in their defensive phase that ensured that, despite Milan having more possession of the ball (71% in the second half), they still did not generate any chances in quantity or quality. Here is a practical example of this effective non-ownership approach.
In the 58th minute, Slavia’s defense and wingers headed towards the players, leaving central midfielders Masopust and Dorley, as well as forward Chytil, to cover the remaining Milan players. In that sequence, Reijnders’ position between the lines prompted Dorley and central defender to double him.
But in an example of the readjustments Slavia were willing to make, once it became clear that Adli was going to get a pass without scoring, Dorley raced to focus, leaving Reijnders behind with his teammate. Adli was still in control of the ball and watching a striker. approve. . .
. . . However, because he was under pressure and knew that all of his advanced goals were well scored (in addition to poor execution), his long pass missed and the ball went out of play.
In the first twenty minutes of the second half, Slavia were not only effective without the ball, but every time they had it, they also caused Milan difficulties in losing possession. The visiting team continued to execute off-the-ball rotations and in one. In one of those plays, Slavia won a free kick in Milan’s half. Thanks to the resulting catch, he scored a goal in the 65th minute.
With a goal deficit reduced to one, Milan’s ball percentage increased further (from 64% between 45-60 minutes to 74% 61-90), but ownership difficulties persisted. And while Milan lacked off-the-ball movement, rhythm and threat in their game (to name a few), Slavia’s role in that shutout will also have to be credited.
As in this example in the 67th minute when from the kick-off the match was 3-2. Milan’s 4 had the ball in front of all the opposing players and made a wide pass to Calabria who had the area in front of them. To him.
However, Calabria were temporarily brought down by Provod (left winger) and then their forward pass to Pulisic suffered the same fate, with the foreign USMNT strongly followed by new left-back Zmrzlý. With limited rapid progression, Milan played on the pitch where previously loose players (i. e. centre-backs); however, what is vital for Slavia are the warring parties who liked to have the ball (the lesser of all evils imaginable).
The action resumed less than ten seconds later, with Tomori making a side pass to Kjær, who then spun the play diagonally to. . .
. . . Pulisic (who was still heavily marked). But to illustrate Slavia’s speed of work, Provod immediately ran to his side. The compromise was that this allowed Calabria to break free momentarily and the right-back responded by making an underlying run that was discovered inside the box. . .
. . . but the visiting team did not panic, as Dorley covered and blocked Calabria’s cross. Even if the cross had been successful, notice how Slavia had returned the nine outfield players to their penalty area to protect the situation.
And this painting speed continued through the second part of the year. In this example, from the 81st minute, most of the Slavia players (green circles) were in their roles as players. This left their central midfielders and forwards (yellow circles) covering 4 Milan. players (black circles).
In the 67th minute, the hosts brought on Luka Jović to provide additional presence as a centre-forward. But (in hindsight) the result of this substitution only served to help the visitors as it meant that their centre-backs were now all now all had a Milan striker and Masopust, Dorley and substitute Ivan Schranz had one less player to play.
By comparing the image above with the one below, you can see how the 3 Slavia players (always highlighted by yellow circles) have to deal with the immediate risk of the ball.
Once again, in the symbol below, the three Slavia players demonstrated how they coordinated to restrict the ownership of the opponent, who prefers to leave the ball to Milan’s centre-backs and deny access to the highest quality players (Adli and Ismael). case).
In this course of the game, Milan’s centre-backs, despite everything, helped to locate a pass between the lines to Leão. . .
. . . however, the Portuguese striker’s first attempted pass to a Milan centre-forward was easily intercepted and then cleared through a Slavia centre-back.
And just when it looked like the game was heading for a 3-2 draw, in the 85th minute, Milan made it 4-2. The preparation for the goal came from a Slavia goal kick. The away team had pushed their players. They had to fight for the aerial duel and then for the second ball, but after the hosts regained possession, they were able to attack a disorganised and stretched opponent’s defensive set-up.
Moments later, an individual flurry from Leão (1v1) and a finger from Pulisic saw the Rossoneri go into the second leg with a two-goal lead.
Pioli explained that his team “. . . He hasn’t qualified for the next round yet, even if the overall lead is good. “And while the effects at this level of the season are of paramount importance, it’s those kinds of performances – he added his struggles with and without propriety – that make the Milan faithful wonder how sustainable those victories are.
Empoli will then play at home in Serie A before travelling to the Czech Republic for the second leg.
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