Bayern struggled in their warm-up match with a four-man defence in their recent draw in Freiburg, so Tuchel opted to replace things up to 3 at half-time, with Leon Goretzka stepping in at left-back in possession. Good for defending champions and has had a popular component to their build-up on the ball ever since. Goretzka shines in a new role where he is able to move with the ball at his feet and open up spaces in depth.
One of the reasons why such a replacement has become imaginable is the emergence of Aleksandar Pavlović and his ability to occupy midfield. He is Bayern’s most productive player with 70% tension control, which is how he is occasionally able to keep up with his team. property under pressure from their opponents. This is also a higher percentage than any Dortmund player. The 19-year-old is key to this new design as he patrols the pitch in the midfield position.
In attack, the two full-backs push high and wide. These defenders act to provide width and back formation depending on the situation. The nominal number 10, which lately is Thomas Müller, moves forward to form the two most sensible along Harry Kane.
This allows nominal wingers Jamal Musiala and Leroy Sané, who like to go unnoticed, break away from their flanks and occupy more central positions in the spaces in between. If Bayern want reinforcements in midfield, Kane or Müller can go under. This creates a smart policy from all angles of attack, as well as two lines that blend well.
The apparent merit of this set-up technique is that Bayern have numerical merit if the opponent is pressing with two top-ranked teams. If the opposing team decides to sit down and attack with a single striker, as Freiburg did, allow one of the two full-backs to dribble the ball and open up play.
The last match against Darmstadt was the best example of this. Goretzka advances with the ball to the inside left lane, passes to a defender and creates a situation where no one can press him because of the triangle in front of him – Goretzka’s presence. It turns him into a diamond, where he can blend in with a teammate. If the Darmstadt defender needs to cut the ball down the middle, which Goretzka eventually does, then he has to be in front of the attacker, who opens a pass anyway.
There’s a lot of movement in the attack Bayern. Si Goretzka can’t dribble past his man, so the full-back comes towards him. If Alphonso Davies or Raphael Guerreiro pass him, they lure the opposing full-back off the byline. This allows the left forward (Kane in the example below) to take his centre-back into a wider position, creating space for the left number 10.
The logical reaction of the defenders turns out to be to move players. If Bayern attack in the middle of the pitch, then they want more players. But that’s where Pavlović comes in. The central midfielder is very clever at staying open when he receives. The ball and tensile strength ensure the best connection between the two halves of the field. Bayern can attack any flank and replace play without problems if necessary.
A clever example of how they can take advantage of the slightest defensive mistake happened against Freiburg. Eric Dier, who played on the right 3 in this match, dribbled down the wing and dislodged the opposing striker. The 19-year-old won the ball and returned it to Goretzka in defense (at the time in the middle of the 3). Roland Sallai’s foul on Pavlović He intended to disrupt play, but Goretzka temporarily took the free kick, moving the ball to the left, where Musiala had space to do what he does most productively: run with the ball to get it in. The Munich club leads 2-1.
Tuchel has also made some adjustments to how Bayern operate when they don’t have possession. Nowadays, the most productive groups have become accustomed to resorting to a 4-4-2 when they don’t have the ball, making the box small and compact. And then urgent like that. It’s something Bayern noticed a lot in the early part of the season, but now it’s the preferred approach.
Bayern’s merit lies here, in addition to the new compact design that it rarely lacked, in Müller’s position. The experienced 12-time Bundesliga winner is very clever at setting things up when he doesn’t have the ball, acting as an urgent coordinator from the front. This means that Kane next to him, as well as Musiala and Sané behind him, can clearly see his signals. When Müller is more withdrawn, he wants to speak with words, which can rarely be difficult in noisy stadiums. , as we will see in Der Klassiker.
Dortmund will also start with a 4-2-3-1 formation, but will play in a 4-1 or 3-2 formation. If you try to expand with a 4 defense and a support, then a flat 4-4. -2 will work well to counteract this. The two wingers will thus be closer to the BVB wingers.
If Dortmund decide to go three deep with two in attack, then Bayern’s midfield may not be strong enough and they may not want to cover either flank with only one occupied. Tuchel will have to come up with a plan to fill the midfield. Maybe ask the winger on the side where the game is rarely positioned to enter. The winger on the side where the ball is will press urgently on the back 3. But this is only one of many features to respond to the known demanding situations posed by Edin Terzić’s tactics. Then it will be a question of which coach has the ultimate – or most productive – ideas and to what extent the players will put them into practice.