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SECTION 1: DIVISIONAL CONTROL
Asset Capture and Divisional Control
Occupation and seizure of property
THE POLITICAL PROCESS surrounding the dissolution of IG Farben began with the end of World War II or, more accurately, immediately after the end of the war in Europe, which was part of the war. The war in Europe ended with Germany signing an unconditional agreement. surrfinisher, either on May 7, 1945 in Reims or on May 8 in Berlin. At that time, IG Farben’s activities as a single, unified company virtually came to a halt. Even before that time, the U. S. military was able to prevent the U. S. military from the United States. The U. S. government had occupied I. G. Farben settled one after another in Germany and Europe and seized their properties. The price of IG Farben’s assets seized on German territory amounted to approximately one billion marks, without fully taking into account the estimated price of the patents and trademarks. The total price of IG Farben’s assets The assets on German territory, according to the balance sheets at the end of 1944, amounted to 1,947 million marks, not counting the equity stake of other companies.
As Figure 8. 1 shows, the majority of IG Farben’s 57. 9% of assets on German territory were in the Soviet zone when Germany was divided into the four occupying powers (the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union). The remaining 42. 1%, or about one billion marks, in the professional zones of Western powers. The breakdown of the latter figure shows 18. 3% of the assets at BASF’s former headquarters in Ludwigshafen, 8. 5% at the former Bayer Leverkusen headquarters, 6. 8% at the former headquarters in Hoechst instead of the same call and 8. 5% of the assets elsewhere.
In the western industrial zone, the former BASF factory in Ludwigshafen, near Mannheim, was occupied by American forces at the end of March 1945 and placed under the direction of the American military government. Bayer’s former factory in Leverkusen, near Cologne, was also occupied by the US. forces in April, but placed under the control of the British Army in June. The activity of the Hoechst factory in Frankfurt am Main also began at the end of March through the US army. Very rare among IG Farben’s main factories, the Hoechst factory has been expanded again almost intact, never having been the target of Allied strategic bombing.
INTRODUCTION
ON APRIL 22, 2011, the House of Representatives of the Japanese Diet made a decision to promote friendship between Japan and Germany on the occasion of the birthday celebration of the 150th anniversary of the friendship treaty between Japan and Prussia in 1861. The solution emphasized that the newly founded Germany in 1871 became a style of Japanese modernization during the Meiji period. And although Japan and Germany fought each other in World War I, the two countries were allies during World War II, launching aggression that caused unprecedented human suffering and property damage in their neighboring countries, but ultimately resulted in in their own defeat and destruction. However, Japan and Germany miraculously managed to rebuild their countries from the ruins and revive their economies. After reflecting on the war they caused and its consequences, the two countries are now cooperating for global peace and prosperity. Currently there are active and constant exchanges between Japanese and Germans in various fields, each respecting each other’s culture and values. The House of Representatives declared in this case that Japan would contribute to the realization of global peace based on a reliable partnership with Germany. Based on this statement, various bodies positioned themselves in both countries on a national, official and personal level. This case offers a smart opportunity for Japan-German dating from an ancient perspective.
There are many books on Japan-Germany relations, adding diplomatic history and comparisons of types of economic development. One of the main considerations in the table of economic and business considerations compares the characteristics of the Japanese and German economies with the Anglo-Saxon economies. the growing weight of Anglo-Saxon economic and business models, on the one hand, and the frequency of global economic crises that erupt in those economies, on the other, an ancient investigation of economics and business in Japan and Germany can simply provide us with some information. Ideas for models of choice.
I am very pleased that Professor KUDŌ has published this collection of his articles written over the past quarter century on Japan’s industry and economic relations with Germany, as well as with the EU and Asia.
Throughout the 1990s, both in Japan and abroad, the doctrine of economic globalization was defended with such intensity that it turns out to be the very spirit of the age. “Globalism,” as the discourse advocating globalization can be called, has become manifestly excessive. in his affirmations, tactically announcing that a unitary and disoriented globality has become or will become a truth in the near future. At the same time, on other fronts there have also been arguments against or distrustful of this attitude.
In fact, in the last decade of the twentieth century, the process of economic globalization has progressed remarkably, thus reinforcing those affirmations in favor of the predominance of globalism. The most surprising progress centers on the instantaneous movement of gigantic sums of money in the foreign money market.
However, the wave of globalization did not suddenly rise in the 1990s. The basis for an immediate outflow of massive amounts of budget abroad was laid in the 1970s, when the liberalization of industry and capital also accelerated in the evolved capitalist countries. In parallel with the transition from the foreign financial formula to a floating rate formula. In the 1980s, this wave of liberalization of industry and capital spread to semi-evolved capitalist countries that had experienced sustained economic expansion, resulting in the status quo of an open economy. global economic formula. This has also boosted foreign remittances. This era was also characterized by a dramatic global expansion of giant corporations founded not only in the United States, but also in Europe and Japan, and a developing trend toward the multinationalization of corporations. Multinationalization has something else: accelerating the foreign movement of the budget. There was also the rise of “neoliberalism”, represented through “reaganomics” and “Thatcherism”, which can be considered the precursors of today’s globalism.
Going further back in history, we place the creation of the Bretton Woods formula at the end of World War II, followed by its maturation in the 1950s and 1960s. This formula was the cornerstone of post-war globalization, born of the disintegration of the global system. If we go back even further, before the First World War, we can see that the British defence of lax industry and the imperialism of lax industry in the nineteenth century was also a type of globalism, and that this was also the era of globalisation.
INTRODUCTION
Relations between Japan and the European Union have experienced industrial imbalances since the 1970s, along with consecutive Japanese surpluses. Dating is now experiencing a kind of new imbalance: that of direct investments. Currently, the volume of Japanese direct investment in the EU is more than ten times that of EU investment in Japan. Certainly, the relationship between Japan and the United States has also experienced investment imbalances, although undoubtedly to a lesser extent. The new concentration of economic relations between Japan and the EU, as well as between Japan and the United States, seems to be moving from industrial imbalance to investment imbalance. The most decisive explanation for investment imbalances appears to be “underinvestment” by Western companies in Japan. As a result, there is a developing trend to take direct measures that may also discourage Japanese investment in Western countries or inspire Western investment in Japan. If Japanese investment were to be further discouraged, voluntary investment restrictions (VIR) could also be introduced as voluntary export restrictions (VER). If the purpose is to promote Western investment in Japan and achieve long-term balance, then, they argue, political, social and cultural obstacles in Japan will have to be removed; the competitiveness of Western corporations will have to be strengthened; or the methods of non-Japanese companies will have to be reviewed with the required competitive benefits. It is the third option that is likely to produce the quickest and most decisive results. In other words, the strategic mistakes of Western multinationals and their ability to take advantage of opportunities in Japan may also be the main explanation for their “underinvestment. ” The aim of this article is to provide evidence to support this proposition by examining the interwar period, during which Western multinationals would likely have pursued long-term methods to permanently penetrate the Japanese market. However, for various reasons, they have not been able to fully exploit the competitive benefits they had.
LOOK
Direct investment and cartels
The interwar era saw the progress of Western multinational corporations, which continued to invest globally despite the developing difficulties brought on by economic nationalism. As Table 6. 1 shows, the Japanese market is no exception.
DEFINE THE TOPIC
TYPIFIED BY SYNTHETIC DETERGENTS, THE CONSUMER CHEMICAL INDUSTRY WAS ONE OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTORS THAT HELPED ADVANCE THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND ESTABLISH A MASS CONSUMPTION SOCIETY. In Japan, the history of the consumer chemical industry dates back to the last nineteenth century. However, its large-scale progression did not occur until after World War II, with the advent of a massive clientelist society in Japan. In the post-war period, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, in this industry as in many others in Japan, the gap in generation and control techniques between Japan and the West, especially the United States, was very large. Thus, the influence of the United States has been overwhelming. In Japan’s customer chemical production industry, companies have been actively learning from the American experience and looking to catch up.
This bankruptcy examines this era of large-scale progression of the Japanese chemical industry from customers in the 1950s and 1960s. He will focus on one of the industry leaders, Kao Soap, now Kao, and explain the company’s turnaround strategy with the U. S. industry and its operations. Since its inception in 1887 and its entry into soap production in 1890, Kao has long maintained a leading position in the Japanese customer chemical market, along with its main competitor Lion Soap, now Lion. from soap and artificial detergents to cosmetics, hygiene products, etc. Even if Western corporations like Procter
In the 1990s, Kao became one of Japan’s most prominent companies, receiving top marks for its production technology, studies and development, marketing and distribution, as well as for its control and internal data sharing and disclosure. In terms of data disclosure and corporate governance, Kao is seen as the spearhead of the globalization wave. But at the same time, the company also offers a more unique control philosophy. Kao’s former chairman, Fumikatsu Tokiwa, in pointing out and criticizing Japanese companies’ enthusiasm for American things, strongly insisted that Kao was a company with a Japanese corporate identity.
The internationalization of business in recent years has highlighted the increasingly cultural facets of business activities. Concepts such as cultural contact and cultural exchange, cultural cooperation and frictions, and cultural learning have become more popular. Culture is perceived as a kind of barrier or impediment. to be surpassed in foreign activities. Companies involved in foreign industry find that it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand, manage, and overcome such impediments. Perhaps they even call anything that is incomprehensible, unmanageable, or insurmountable a cultural barrier or impediment. .
Recent examples of corporations seeking to enter the Japanese market show that they have blamed their lack of good luck on the “proximity” of the Japanese market, regularly highlighting the uniqueness of Japanese business culture. The Keiretsu system, which would exclude foreign corporations, and Shotengai, the grocery shopping street, which would exclude foreign products, as well as a more blatant bureaucracy for government protectionism. On the other hand, Japanese entrepreneurs operating in the European market also face difficulties that they consider to be in detail connected with the cultural nature of European countries. Some Japanese corporations are even moving towards building their own corporate identity on a global scale. For example, Canon has followed the motto “a corporate culture that can be accepted not only through locals, but also through the world’s inhabitants”.
Awareness of cultural differences and, in particular, cultural barriers is not a new phenomenon in the business world. Companies that have faced difficulties in foreign markets to internationalize their activities have left a heavy balance. Despite vehement pressure from the United States due to complaints about Japanese industrial practices and alleged cultural barriers to imports, it is vital to concentrate on the experience of German exporters prior to 1939. German corporations of the time, like American corporations today, were convinced that there were significant cultural differences that prevented their effective implementation. Japanese market penetration and dominance.
The upcoming bankruptcy aligns with reports from top German exporters to Japan, such as Krupp, Siemens and IG Farben, and shows the effect of Japan’s expressed cultural context on some disappointed German companies.
INTRODUCTION
THIS CHAPTER EXAMINES the evolution of foreign cartels by focusing on the organizational procedure, as well as the rationalization of production and sales in corporations in other countries through foreign cooperation and the festival that took place. As a definition of cartels, we propose the following: “Cartels have been explained as voluntary agreements between independent companies in a single sector or in very similar sectors with the aim of exercising a monopoly over the market. “The United Nations Department of Economic Affairs provides the following definition of foreign cartels: “International cartels are of the same nature and necessarily pursue the same objective [as domestic cartels], provided that the contracting parties are located in two or more countries and possibly be individual companies or teams of companies already grouped into domestic cartels.
Within foreign cartels, there are raw fabric cartels and manufactured goods cartels. A review of manufacturing cartels or, more specifically, commercial cartels is carried out because raw fabric cartels are affected in many cases through geographical, political and diplomatic points in the countries where the raw fabrics are produced. By contrast, manufactured cartels are more strongly influenced by operational points, such as production generation and sales conditions. Manufactured cartels are better suited for an old investigation of foreign cartel control.
We have confined ourselves to the foreign cartels of the interwar period, of the 1920s and 1930s, because it was in the context of the post-World War I economic restructuring procedure, in the 1920s, that the large-scale status quo of foreign firms may first be observed. Moreover, it was at this time that the global economy began to reorganize itself through foreign festivals and cooperation. One of the points behind the emergence of foreign cartels was the imbalance between production and consumption. This was due to the accumulation of excess generation. capacity in excess of demand, brought about through the structure or expansion of production facilities to meet the pressing demand that arose from the war. Foreign nitrogen and dye cartels are two examples of cartels that have emerged in this way.
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the reaction of Japanese capitalism to globalization or Americanization in the 1990s and early twenty-first century, comparing the Japanese case with the German case. We begin by examining the reasons why the German case is taken into account when examining Japan’s reaction to globalization or Americanization in the 1990s and early twenty-first century. the interrelated processes of globalization and Americanization. Special attention is also paid to the method of comparison, where we recommend that capitalism is explained and institutionalized through the state. We then turn to an old comparison between Japan and Germany in relation to globalization and Americanization. Our third point is a comparison focused on the two central features of capitalism, namely formula and outward orientation.
METHODOLOGY
First, methodological questions can be asked about the explanation of why to make a comparison with Germany (West Germany and unified Germany) when examining the reaction of Japanese capitalism to globalization. In the pre-Cold War system, it was really useful to make a comparison between Japan and Germany. Its foundation lies above all in its not unusual or parallel ancient experiences, as illustrated by its defeat in the war, the profession and the post-war reforms promoted by the Allied powers, as well as its economic expansion and its rise to the Economy.
However, with the end of the Cold War around 1990, there was a great divergence in the paths charted between the two countries. West Germany achieved unification with East Germany and experienced the end of the Cold War, one of the main reasons for which was unification. As the political, military, economic, and social integration of Europe has advanced, unified German capitalism has become “Europeanized. “Indeed, after the advent of the only currency, the euro, some might argue for a debate on European capitalism. instead of German capitalism. In contrast, Japanese capitalism exists in a foreign environment centered in East Asia, where the Cold War formula persists, as illustrated by the lifestyles of divided states, the formula of some bilateral security treaties, the presence of the U. S. military, and lack or underdevelopment of regional integration. It is therefore unimaginable to speak of an “Asianization” of Japanese capitalism or of Asian capitalism at the institutional level.
The main purpose of this book is to shed light on the state of industrial relations between Japan and Germany during the 20th and early 21st centuries. Another objective is to provide explanations about the structures and processes of the global economy during the pandemic. By maintaining the concentration on Japanese and German companies, as well as on European companies, and trying to give a transparent picture of the Japanese economic situation and europea. la national economy and that of companies.
On a global scale, Germany has long played a vital role. It was a major player in the two global wars of the first part of the 20th century and, today – especially at the end of the century and the beginning of this century – it was the driving force of European integration and continues to be the driving force. of European integration. United States maximum living spouse in continental Europe. For Japan, its relations with Germany have long been vital, while Japan is a country that Germany must ignore. In political and diplomatic relations in the early part of the 20th century, the two countries came into conflict, with the “German-Japanese War” of 1914, which was one side of World War I, as a representative example; and they also cooperated, as symbolized by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in 1940. Simultaneously, in the sphere of the economy (whether advertising or national), there was festival between Japanese and German corporations in the global market and collaboration, for example, generation. License. Needless to say, relations between the two countries included Japan’s scrutiny of Germany. This study was broad and deep, covering the formation of the state system, science and generation, and reaching the realm of ideology.
After World War II, the two nations continued to be vital to each other, especially in economic relations (both industrial and internal economic), and their relations grew as their festival and collaboration unfolded. During this period, unlike in the past, Germany began to examine Japanese corporate control and technology. But what is even more significant are the apparent parallels between the measures taken across the two countries: that is, the parallels between defeat as allies, occupation, postwar reform and reconstruction, and the proper “economic” powers. “
INTRODUCTION
The INTERNATIONALIZATION of the Japanese economy has been proclaimed on several occasions, although this is limited to the post-war period. The express meaning of foreignization varies with each successive wave, but sometimes, until the late 1980s, the trend was from internal foreignization (the foreignization of the Japanese economy itself) to external foreignization (the foreign influence of the Japanese economy). The latter can be described as “foreign Japanization. ” Given Japan’s growing prestige in the global economy, such a trend was quite herbal (Ozawa 1995; Kudō 1994a, 1995a).
However, since the early 1990s, there has been a change: “internal foreignization” has once again been at the center of the debate. For example, the main themes included opening up supposedly closed markets, removing barriers to FDI in Japan, and emphasizing the “foreign” market. To be sure, the debate on “foreign” continues, but it concentrates less on the foreign active role of the Japanese economy than on its passive impact. Take, for example, the debate over chaos that may only accompany the widespread sell-off of U. S. Treasuries (short-term government bonds) in Japan. Why the debate has evolved in this way requires analysis, but it cannot be denied that the substitution has indeed taken place.
In fact, these issues took on a new color in the 1990s, but they remain at the center of diversifications on a recurring theme in the past. The old term “internationalization” has also largely given way to the term “globalization,” although today it’s really just a matter of terminology. Does this mean that the factor of internationalization or globalization of the Japanese economy in the 1990s and early 21st century does not deserve educational scrutiny?Two reasons recommend the opposite. First, the Japanese economy of the 1990s followed the unprecedented experience of the “economic bubble” of the late 1980s. The existing economy is marked by the scars inflicted by the “bubble,” which have touched the very center of the design of Second, after an era in which the decline of American hegemony was widely announced, a strong American influence, or at least the sense of such influence, resurfaced in the 1990s.
INTRODUCTION
IN THIS CHAPTER I wish to read about the motivations and methods of Kao Corporation Limited in its accession to Europe and to talk about the adjustment disorders that would possibly be encountered in this process. Kao was one of the first soap brands in Japan. It has a history of almost a hundred years and is a leader in marketing and advertising. In addition, it has actively invested in studies and factory apparatus in the fields of oils and greases, surface science and polymers, and diversified to cover the production of detergents, cosmetics, disposable diapers, tonics, floppy disks, etc. The replacement of the company’s official name in 1985 from “Kao Soap Company” to the existing “Kao Corporation” is a sign of this strong preference for diversification.
The main explanation for my research on Kao’s case was the strong impression I was made on the centenary of the company’s history by the marked progression of the foreign business, which had recently been contrasted with the general progression of the company’s management. ease of access to data sources, but those weren’t my only explanations. The access of Japanese chemical companies to European markets is less obvious than that of brands of electrical or automotive equipment. As a result, chemical companies are not yet at the center of the industrial shock, and adaptation disorders have not yet become apparent. , given that Kao is the case of a company that is advancing on the basis of its business and technological superiority, the adjustment disorders discussed below are most likely to be even more significant. Kao, in this sense, offers attractive curtains. As a case study on localization and the attempts of Japanese corporations to adapt in Europe.
WHY EUROPE?THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACTIVITIES IN THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES
From the outer edge to the center and diversification
Even before World War II, Kao had established production centers in East and Southeast Asia. However, these were lost with the Japanese defeat and have no direct bearing on existing development. The new starting point after the war was in 1955 with the resumption of exports. of familiar products to Southeast Asian markets.
INTRODUCTION
IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1980s, and especially with the dissolution of the borders between West and East Germany in the autumn of 1989, all of Europe was plunged into an era of tumultuous adjustments in social, political and economic regimes. Around the world, affecting even Japón. De fact, the collapse of the Japanese political regime in 1955, which once revolved around the rivalry between two primary political components, can be seen as a component of the chain reaction to European turmoil. This is not the first time Japan has been rocked by turmoil in Europe. Specifically, the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in the summer of 1939 led to the mass resignation of the Hiranuma government and the outbreak of war in Europe some time later, as well as the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union. Two years later, this is one of the points that led Japan to turn around.
Of course, there are several differences between ancient experience and the current turn of events. On the one hand, unlike the past situation, Europe today is moving towards regional integration at the European level. On the other hand, relations between Japan and Europe today are radically different from those of the late 1930s. Previously, Japan suffered shocks from Europe and was affected uniformly; It was imaginable (but perhaps not appropriate) to explain social and economic advances in Europe without any reference to advances in Japan. But today, the Japanese economy has become too vital to be overlooked in explaining the socioeconomic turmoil in Europe. On the contrary, Japan’s economic strength was one of the main culprits in triggering the turmoil. Indeed, it can simply be said that European efforts to unify the European Community (EC) market until the end of 1992 were undertaken primarily as a European reaction to the economic challenge posed by Japan. It can also be said that the collapse of the socialist systems of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was largely due to the weakening of their economies under the crushing impact of the developing regions of the East and Southeast. Asia, along with its closest neighbors. ties to the Japanese economy and personal businesses.
INTRODUCTION
Reappearance of Americanization in the 1990s
Among the most vital trends in the foreign economy during the 1990s was the enormous influence of the U. S. economy, which manifested itself on a global scale. This has led to a new debate about Americanization imaginable. The argument for Americanization has been fiercely challenged. through counterarguments. This controversy has been related to the controversy over globalization, which evolved with Americanization. The debate over convergence or divergence has also evolved, asking whether each nation’s capitalism, with its own character, will replace through Americanization and globalization. This debate continues even after long-standing prosperity in the United States began to decline after 2000. Despite the economic slowdown, Americanization itself does not seem to have lost its dynamism. It is attractive to ask why this persists. In addition, its consequences are still unclear.
The word Americanization itself has a long history. One of the earliest meanings of the word nation-building in the early history of the United States. Today, it is used in a variety of contexts: political, economic, social, cultural, and civilizational. Here we use the word for the U. S. movement of technology, control concepts and practices, and institutional frameworks. We call this influence Americanization when institutions and organizations in other countries use the United States as a “point of reference” for local replacements. From his point of view, Americanization is not a style (or styles) of values and behaviors as such, but a process. Its effects are characterized through selection, transfer, replacement and adaptation to local, regional or national circumstances. Americanization does not mean that after its appearance, all organizations, establishments, values, and behaviors have become the same as those of the United States, even if they were particularly closer to American styles than before.
During the 1990s, reunified Germany and Japan came under abundant pressure from Americanization and globalization. They were not exceptional in this regard, but those advances were of particular importance to both countries: in the post-World War II era, either of them was already under significant American influence. Then, for about two decades, in the 1970s and 1980s, they came to constitute opportunities for the United States as an example of a successful capitalist economy.
THIS ARTICLE DEALS WITH THE PROCESS OF ACCELERATION OF THE JAPANESE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY WITH THAT OF WESTERN COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY WITH THE GERMAN AND WEST GERMAN INDUSTRIES, DURING THE PERIOD 1925-1960, focusing on the post-war years 1955-1960, the first and decisive years of Japanese petrochemicals from the point of view of business history.
UPGRADE TESTING
The first to catch up: 1925-1945
The modern chemical coal industry began to emerge in Japan at the end of the century, when various private companies, including those in coal, gas, and forced mining, entered this new field. It then found its decisive step in the unique situations of World War I, when the import of primary chemicals had become almost impossible, export opportunities for the fledgling Japanese industry opened up abruptly, and the Japanese government took the initiative to inspire the recovery procedure by implementing legislation to herald the progress of the domestic industry. and the creation of a national property and subsidy corporation, which was later privatized. This was the beginning of the first attempt through the Japanese chemical industry to catch up with complex Western industries, especially German industry.
After the end of the war, Japanese companies, both private and subsidized by the State, faced with recurrent competitive situations in the global market, did everything possible, incorporating new products imitating Western products, to maintain their presence in the Japanese market. The Government also sought to protect the Japanese market for domestic manufacturers through its tariff policy, as well as through restrictions on direct imports and restrictions against inward direct investment; These policies were not comprehensive, but they were selective, and were implemented with a time difference that defined the sector.
German chemical corporations, run through IG Farben, founded in 1925, responded to emerging Japanese competition with bilateral market agreements with them on the basis of foreign cartels across sectors, of which IG Farben was the leader and principal member, and by rejecting in recent years repeated proposals from Japanese corporations for generation transfer agreements.
INTRODUCTION
BEFORE World War II, foreign direct investment through German corporations in Japan was basically aimed at building a sales and distribution organization, with only a small portion going into local production. The investment was made through Siemens, an electrical engineering giant, the largest in local production. The company established Fuji Electric Manufacturing Co. Ltd as a joint venture with Furukawa Business Group.
Siemens started its business activities in Japan at an early stage. Export activities began in the 1860s. Siemens exported other types of products, from heavy electrical machinery to soft appliances. For this reason, sales agencies in Japan were first identified and then local subsidiaries. Even before World War I, a direct investment mission had been established in Japan to identify local production. Local production then enters its initial phase.
But Siemens’ plan to invest directly in Japan didn’t materialize until after World War I. Competition between foreign and Japanese corporations in the Japanese market intensified in the context of World War I, leading to the resurgence of electrical machinery corporations, more comfortable business practices, and continued to put into effect capital liberalization policies in Japan. Faced with this situation, on August 22, 1923, Siemens established Fuji Electric as a joint venture with Furukawa Electric Industry, a member of the Furukawa Group of Companies.
The aim of this article is to talk about the position occupied by Siemens in Japan as a multinational company operating in a dictatorial environment, and to discover how Siemens perceived this environment, what methods it developed, what kind of structures it put in place, how it developed its activity and the effects it nevertheless obtained.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Before delving into this case, I would like to provide some initial considerations related to the issues discussed in this workshop.
First, it is mandatory to identify the facts about direct investments made through Western corporations in Japan during the interwar period.
The rise of foreign direct investment in Japan is a recent phenomenon, and the investments that existed before World War II were incredibly modest by fashionable standards.